Date: | 2000-2006 |
Description: | Conditional cash transfer programme (CCT) that operated between 2000 and 2006 with financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and technical support from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). As an innovation, a process of geographic targeting was carried out, which included an experimental design that subsequently allowed the execution of impact evaluations. In turn, as in the Honduran experience, it introduced cash transfers to the supply of social services to adapt to the effects of an increasing demand. Towards the end of the programme, the "Sistema de Atención a Crisis (SAC)" was launched under a similar intervention model. However, the CCT was replaced in 2007 by the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation with new food production programmes: Hambre Cero and Usura Cero. |
Characteristics
Target population: | Families in extreme poverty. |
Geographic scale: | Rural Areas |
Targeting method: | 1) Geographic 2) Proxy means test |
Registry of recipients: | Single Register of Beneficiaries (RUB) |
Exit strategies or criteria: | Maximum period of time in the programme: 3 years. After this time the transfers were still granted for two more years. |
Comments: | The programme had two phases (2000-2002 y 2003-2006). The second phase allowed for a finer adjustment of the components of the programme, targeting mechanisms, supply side supports, exit strategy, and institutional setting. The RUB could not be applied nationwide, and was limited to only 4 municipalities. |
Institutionality
Legal framework: | |
Responsible organization(s): | Supplementary Social Fund (FSS) |
Executing organization(s): | Phase I: Emergency Social Investment Fund (FISE); Phase II: Ministry of the Family. |
Source of funding: | Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) and Government of Nicaragua. |
1) Bono de seguridad alimentaria (Food Security Grant)
Recipient(s): | All participant households of the programme |
Mode of transfer: | Flat transfer, decreasing over time |
Mode of delivery: | Delivery / Cash withdrawal |
Periodicity of delivery: | Bimonthly |
Recipient of the transfer: | Mother |
Maximum per household: | One transfer per household |
Conditionalities: | Women and adolescents: attendance at bi-monthly training sessions; Children under 9 years: keeping up to date the calendar of vaccinations; Boys / girls, adolescents and women of reproductive age: Attendance to medical checks. |
Sanctions: | RPS I: children should stay at a healthy weight, and if they are underweight for two consecutive revisions, the family will lose the transfer. |
2) Bono educativo (Education Grant)
Recipient(s): | Families with at least one child between 7 and 13 years who has not completed fourth grade. |
Mode of transfer: | Flat transfer |
Mode of delivery: | Delivery / Cash withdrawal |
Periodicity of delivery: | Bimonthly |
Recipient of the transfer: | Mother |
Maximum per household: | One transfer per household |
Conditionalities: | Education: Children between 7 and 13 years: Attendance to school with a maximum of 3 unexcused absences per month (95% attendance); Household: must use the transfer in education, as specified |
Sanctions: | RPS I: Si los niños pierden más de las ausencias justificadas, se les deben proporcionar una nota del doctor para evitar ser penalizado. Esta transferencia se da a los hogares, así que si un niño no asiste a la escuela mientras que los otros lo hacen, la familia pierde su transferencia para ese ciclo. |
3) Mochila Escolar (School backpack)
Recipient(s): | Families with children between first and fourth grade. |
Mode of transfer: | Flat transfer |
Mode of delivery: | Delivery / Cash withdrawal |
Periodicity of delivery: | Annual |
Recipient of the transfer: | Mother |
Maximum per household: | One transfer per household |
Conditionalities: | Education: Children: must be enrolled in an educational establishment at the beginning of the school year. |
4) Bono a la oferta en salud (Health Supply Grant)
Recipient(s): | Health care providers (non-profit and profit private institutions chosen after a competitive bidding). |
Mode of transfer: | Transfers according to the number of patients within certain age ranges and types of consultation. |
Comments: | In targeted communities all households that fulfill the conditionalities are eligible, however only households selected by means test can access the grant. In Phase I payment to suppliers was also subject to the fulfillment of a goal of care target of 98% of the population in each subgroup. In phase II it was canceled because there were collusive practices between households and healthcare providers. |
Description: | Cash transfer to meet increased demand for health services. |
Amount : | Up to USD$ 90 per household served per year |
5) Bono formación ocupacional (Occupational Training Grant)
Recipient(s): | Young people between 14 and 25 who have completed primary education and / or who are literate, have completed their schooling years and asked to enter the programme. |
Mode of transfer: | Flat transfer |
Mode of delivery: | Delivery / Cash withdrawal |
Periodicity of delivery: | Monthly |
Recipient of the transfer: | Mother |
Maximum per household: | One transfer |
Conditionalities: | Training: Commitment of the household of sending their young people between 14-25 years to occupational training courses. |
Sanctions: | The non-justification of absence lead to the loss of the grant |
Comments: | Recipients must attend the vocational courses to receive the transfer "opportunity cost"; they must have a business plan approved in order to receive the "productive" transfer, one time only, to cover the costs of starting a small business in the vocation selected. The use of the grant of enabling production is contingent on the purchase of inputs, enabling workspace and making investments to improve market access. |
Description: | Cash transfer established in Phase II to address the lack of opportunities for young people who had completed primary education. |
Amount : | Up to three months of classes are free (amounts depend on the chosen course). A transfer of USD $15 per month is granted to cover the "opportunity cost" of participating in the course. A grant of USD $200 is given to enable production upon completion of the courses. |
6) Bono a la oferta educativa (Education Supply Grant)
Recipient(s): | Associations of parents, teachers |
Comments: | The school children of eligible households must attend school, households must send transfers to the respective parent associations or directly to the teachers, and the teacher must participate in the local parents association sponsored by the Ministry of Education. In targeted communities all households that fulfill the conditionalities are eligible, however only households selected by means test can access the grant. |
Description: | Cash transfer to meet increased demand for educational services. The transfer also aims to increase the salaries of teachers and encourage their attendance to school given the high absenteeism in the rural areas of the country. |
Amount : | USD$ 8 per child/per year |
Long-Term Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers: Review of the Evidence
Author: | Millán, T. M., Barham, T., Macours, K., Maluccio, J. A., & Stampini, M. |
Date: | 2019 |
Publication info: | The World Bank Research Observer, 34(1), 119–159 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Leveling the Intra-household Playing Field: Compensation and Specialization in Child Labor Allocation
Author: | Del Carpio, X. and Macours, K. |
Date: | 2009 |
Publication info: | Policy Research Working Paper 4822, The World Bank |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Does child labor always decrease with income ? an evaluation in the context of a development program in Nicaragua
Author: | Del Carpio, X. |
Date: | 2008 |
Publication info: | Policy Research Working Paper 4694, The World Bank |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Debunking the Stereotype of the Lazy Welfare Recipient: Evidence from Cash Transfer Programs
Author: | Banerjee et al. |
Date: | 2017 |
Publication info: | The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 32, no. 2 (August 2017) |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Welfare programs and labor supply in developing countries: experimental evidence from Latin America
Author: | Alzúa, M.L., Cruces, G. and Ripani, L. |
Date: | 2012 |
Publication info: | Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 2013), pp. 1255-1284 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Are Conditional Cash Transfers Fulfilling Their Promise? Schooling, Learning, and Earnings After 10 Years
Author: | Barham, T., Macours, K., and Maluccio, J. |
Date: | 2017 |
Publication info: | Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper DP11937 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
More Schooling and More Learning? Effects of a Three-Year Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Nicaragua after 10 Years
Author: | Barham, T., Macours, K., Maluccio, J. |
Date: | 2013 |
Publication info: | IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-432 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Boys’ Cognitive Skill Formation and Physical Growth: Long-Term Experimental Evidence on Critical Ages for Early Childhood Interventions
Author: | Barham, T., Macours, K., and Maluccio, J. |
Date: | 2013 |
Publication info: | American Economic Review, Vol. 103(3), pp. 467–471. |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Three essays on investments in Children's Human Capital
Author: | Bustello, M. |
Date: | 2011 |
Publication info: | PhD dissertattion. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Heterogeneous Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from Nicaragua
Author: | Dammert, A. |
Date: | 2008 |
Publication info: | IZA DP No. 3653 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
The influence of conditional cash transfers on eligible children and their siblings
Author: | Lincove, J., and Parker, A. |
Date: | 2015 |
Publication info: | Education Economics |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Conditional cash transfers, female bargaining power and parental labour supply
Author: | Novella, R., Ripani, L., Cruces, G., and Alzúa, M. |
Date: | 2012 |
Publication info: | IDB Working paper No. IDB-WP-368 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers in Nicaragua on Consumption, Productive Investments, and Labor Allocation
Author: | Maluccio, J. |
Date: | 2007 |
Publication info: | ESA Working Paper No. 07-11 |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Impact evaluation of a conditional cash transfer program: the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social
Author: | Maluccio, John and Rafael Flores |
Date: | 2005 |
Publication info: | Research report 141. Washington D.C. International Food Policy Research Center (IFPRI) [online] |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | Impact evaluation |
Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social y Sistema de Atención a Crisis en Transferencias con corresponsabilidad. Una mirada latinoamericana, E. Cohen y R. Franco (coords.)
Author: | Largaespada Fredersdorff, Carmen |
Date: | 2006 |
Publication info: | Mexico, FLACSO/SEDESOL [online] |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | General information |
Performance-Based Incentives for Health: Demand and Supply-Side Incentives in the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social
Author: | Castro, Leslie and Fernando Regalía |
Date: | 2007 |
Publication info: | CGD Working Paper (119). Washington, DC, Center for Global Development [online] |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | General information/evaluation |
Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social: An Exemplary But Short-Lived Conditional Cash Transfer Programme
Author: | Moore, Charity |
Date: | 2009 |
Publication info: | Country Study (17), Brasilia. International Poverty Center (IPC) [online] |
Link: | See Webpage |
Topic: | General information |