Red de Desarrollo Social de América Latina y el Caribe
Plataforma virtual para la difusión de conocimiento sobre desarrollo social

Inequality and Labor Market Institutions

 

Autor institucional : FMI
Autor/Autores: Florence Jaumotte, Carolina Osorio Buitron
Fecha de publicación: Julio, 2015
Alcance geográfico: Internacional
Publicado en: Internacional
Descargar: Descargar PDF
Resumen: This paper takes a fresh look at the causes of the rise of inequality in advanced economies, focusing on the relationship between labor market institutions and the distribution of incomes—which has featured less prominently in recent debates. We find evidence that the erosion of labor market institutions is associated with the rise of income inequality in our sample of advanced economies, notably at the top of the income distribution. Our key findings are that the decline in unionization is related to the rise of top income shares and less redistribution, while the erosion of minimum wages is correlated with considerable increases in overall inequality. There is also some evidence that the broad extension of collective agreements to non-union members is associated with higher inequality, likely owing to higher unemployment. Finally, we confirm that financial deregulation and lower top marginal tax rates are related with higher inequality. The most novel result is the strong negative relationship between unionization and top earners’ income shares. This finding challenges preconceptions about the channels through which union density affects income distribution. Indeed, the widely held view is that changes in labor market institutions affect low- and middlewage workers but are unlikely to have a direct impact on top income earners. We argue that if de-unionization weakens earnings for middle- and low-income workers, this necessarily increases the income share of corporate managers and shareholders. The channels through which weaker unions could potentially lead to higher top income shares include the positive effect of weaker unions on the share of capital income—which tends to be more concentrated than labor income—and the fact that lower union density may reduce workers’ influence on corporate decisions, including those related to top executive compensation.
   

 

 

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