| Autor institucional : | ILO, OIT |
| Autor/Autores: | WENDY JANSSENS, BERBER KRAMER |
| Fecha de publicación: | Agosto, 2012 |
| Alcance geográfico: | Internacional |
| Publicado en: | Internacional |
| Descargar: | Descargar PDF |
| Resumen: | This paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsurance. |
