

# New Zealand and Chilean immigrant labour-stratification

## *Un comparación de estratificación laboral de inmigrantes entre Nueva Zelanda y Chile*

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### *Abstract*

*The objective of this paper is to identify the key facilitators and inhibitors for the obtainment of jobs of recently arrived New Zealand and Chilean immigrant populations. The hypothesis states that certain ethnic groups take upon specific types of work, such as female Peruvian migrants as domestic workers in Chile. Interviews were conducted among immigrants to gain insight into their experiences of obtaining work in their destination country. The comparison between Chile and New Zealand immigration trends has drawn out specific factors that need to be looked at to diversify- predominantly to professionalize- immigrant labour sectors. This paper concludes that migration is a natural and historical movement which continues to be strongly determined by the geopolitical paradigm of nation-state laws (immigration policy) and physical geography barriers. For this reason, it is recommended that governments regularly amend immigration policies according to its relevant domestic and international circumstances. Governments are also encouraged to look into progressive urban-planning measures to increase social networks among immigrants and non-immigrants, since a wider social network is positively correlated with satisfactory job obtainment and higher levels of wellbeing. Further recommendations given in this paper include 'desegregation bussing' to facilitate ethnic-socio-economic integration among children, and the provision of institutions dispersed throughout the state (and not only in capital cities) that help to validate qualifications or skills, and regularize entry permissions.*

*Key words: geopolitics, stratification, urbanization, immigration, New Zealand, Chile, policy, sector, labour, demography, regularization, integration*

## Acknowledgements.

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## *Prologue*

For the most part, people enter jobs that suit their attributes. Such is the basic function of capitalist society; humans are capital, and their capital is quantified by their skills, character or qualifications. However, it is observed that many recent migrants to New Zealand and Chile enter jobs based on country of origin, which may simply be a representation of distinct national characteristics, though this is not certain<sup>1</sup>. For example, it is observed that recent Haitian migrants to Chile are known to sell basic items, such as ‘Super 8’ chocolate bars, or packets of ginger, limes and garlic on the side of the street. In New Zealand, Indian immigrants have a perception of being *Uber* or taxi drivers, whilst Korean immigrants have a reputation of owning Japanese sushi restaurants.

The observations of industry-stratification according to country of origin are not the first of its kind. Others observe the similar temporal and spatial patterns among the new flows of migrants entering Chile, New Zealand, and around the world. This paper seeks to understand the underlying causes of these stereotypes and associated labour stratification, with the intention of constructing policy to diversify industry specialization employment among new migrants.

Migration is not a new phenomenon, although the circumstances influencing migration flows are always changing. Hence, there exists a continuous literature gap concerning the migration flows of the present tense. Around the world, the majority of migration is caused by a desire to seek a better life, usually based upon better economic prospects. This is why the international division of labour based on nationality or ethnic background may be considered problematic: migrants unable to fulfil a job of their preference or suitability in their destination country will have not fulfilled their motivation to move in the first place.

In academia, there is a lack of literature that analyses the detriments or benefits of industry stratification among ethnic-migrant groups. Nevertheless, in a world in which there are growing sentiments against the ‘other’, highlighted by the success of populist movements, this paper argues that ethnic stratification in the workforce is both a cause and a consequence of anti-immigrant sentiments. Last year, international news stated the following:

*‘Waves of migrants from poorer Latin American countries are coming to Chile, putting a strain on social services*

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<sup>1</sup> This paper strongly considers intersectionality as an important factor in social science. Hence it also understands that ‘country of origin’, or ‘ethnicity’ are not the causes of predisposition to certain types of work, but other influences- perhaps such as character, values, language- that are attributed to certain places

*and causing local resentment. It is beginning to become as politicized as in the United States and Europe.'*  
(Arostegui, 2017)

Populist causes often support the need or desire for homogenous nation-states; this may be perceived by homogeneity in skin, colour, culture, race, language, or a combination of these factors (o'Neil, 2015). A more ethnically integrated and diverse workforce in a place will refresh the referenced definition of homogeneity into one that better suits the globalizing reality of today.

Stratification of labour among new migrants in a capitalist society facilitates exploitation of said workers. The tight demand for jobs, has left migrants with little choice but to work in low-skilled or illegal jobs that pay poorly or do not recognize the internationally agreed rights of workers (C. a. D. Revenco & Mullan, 2014; Stefoni, Leiva, & Bonhomme, 2017; United Nations, 1990) For example, one interview subject from New Zealand remarked:

*"Most immigrants don't have a choice, hence end taking any job within hospo [hospitality] with minimum pay to support themselves"*

The exploitation of the migrant worker is a problem more grandiose than may be two-dimensionally perceived: long hours of poorly-paid work inhibit the obtainment of valid qualifications, social networks, and a lifestyle that supports a healthy mental and physical wellbeing. Furthermore, the exploitation of the migrant worker creates an environment of over-competition; the cheapening of certain industrial sectors. Not only is this detrimental to the long-term sustainability of an economy, it perpetuates feelings of resentment from existing nationals towards migrants. It is not uncommon to hear words along the lines of *'migrants are taking our jobs'* in many economically developed states around the world.

The epistemological method of this research paper lies within the 'pragmatic'<sup>2</sup> framework. Comparing the recent diasporic movements into Chile and New Zealand in this paper has been made with the ideal of problem-solving policy gaps of socially constructed paradigms such as ethnicity. Ethnicity and nationality are two distinct concepts (the latter derives from a geo-political context, whereas the former is subject to a persons' self-classification). This data in this paper deals with the immigrants' country of origin, but due to the complex nature of immigration, where, for example, a Peruvian national may become a Chilean national, the terminology 'ethnicity' will be used instead of 'nationality'.

## *New Zealand and Chile: comparison of histories, policies, and geographies.*

New Zealand and Chile are two distinct nation-states situated at opposite ends of the Pacific Ocean, yet, they share many similarities. This paper will examine the migratory patterns of both countries, in which it seeks to discover modes of migration and what seems to be a predisposed and or limited selection of

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<sup>2</sup> Pragmatism is defined by looking at the interactions of society as a whole, as opposed to the individual. Pragmatism attempts to understand the world through examining practical problems and providing suitable practical solutions. Ethnography- the study of socially constructed ethnic identities- is an example of a pragmatic research epistemology. For more information on epistemological frameworks, see o'Leary (2017).

employment opportunities based on the migrant's country of origin (International Organization for Migration, 2011). The histories, policies and geographies of either place will be briefly examined to place context for the research that follows in this paper.

### *History*

New Zealand is a country composed primarily of migrants. This has meant that the overseas-born population is a lot higher in New Zealand (~19%) than in Chile (2.6%)(Central Intelligence Agency, 2018a, 2018b). This study compares the new flows of migrants, as opposed to past movements (Spoonley & Gendall, 2010). Nevertheless, histories remain important to new research, as they are a factor likely to determine society that accepts or rejects distinct languages, cultures, or ethnic-traits.

Both New Zealand and Chile have experienced moving histories of indigenous populations: in New Zealand, the Maori; Chile, the Mapuche, among others. Despite these indigenous histories majority populations in both Chile and New Zealand view themselves as having derived from European heritage- Chile of the Spanish, and in New Zealand of the United Kingdom (The Economist, 2018).

Only recently has Chile been receiving immigrants from Latin American countries. Before 1990, Chile received migrants from Germany, Italy, and middle-eastern countries like Palestine. The first migrants from Peru came in the late 80s and 90s; noted to be either refugees or wealthy Peruvians who came to Chile for its relative economic prosperity. However, during the twenty-first century, the number of Peruvians has exponentially increased: for example, the estimated 2002 Peruvian-born population in Chile was 37,860 people. In 2009, this figure tripled to 130,859 people. The foreign born populations of Latin American states, such as Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador- also doubled or tripled in size (C. a. D. Reveco & Mullan, 2014).

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, New Zealand was a destination country for European migrants. There are also 'old' New Zealanders of Asian descent. For example, Chinese migrants arrived in the Otago region in the late half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to work in Otago gold mines Such migrants were subject to work exploitation and racism by their European acquaintances. Although these early Asian migrants and their descendants have -or were- in New Zealand a lot longer than a lot of people who consider themselves 'New Zealanders' today (usually those with a white-European appearance) people from Asian descent remain an ethnic 'minority' (Johnson & Moloughney, 2006). Given that New Zealand is a country consisted of migrants over the last century, it is problematic to distinguish who is truly a 'New Zealander' and who is a 'foreigner' (Gamlen, 2010). Hence, the investigation of the 2010-2018 migrant flows into both countries are merely a new wave of an old phenomenon.

### *Migration and Policy*

New Zealand and Chile favour neoliberal policy in their governance systems, to side with the United States during the ideological debate culminated in the Cold War in the 1970s-1980s. As part of neoliberal policy, both countries opened their doors to migrants- the labour of migrant is considered as a form of economic output (capital). Both New Zealand (2.0 live births at 2017) and Chile (1.8 births at 2017) are experiencing low birth rates due to their relatively high levels of economic development, and hence, also

rely on in-migration to support their ageing populations (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018b; United Nations Statistics Division, 2018).

The economic push and pull factors for migration has been termed as the 'New Economics of Labour Migration (Massey, 1993), however, given recent political and humanitarian crises in Venezuela and Haiti, it is understood that not all reasons for in-migration to Chile are motivated fiscally.

The capitalization of migrants is more profound in New Zealand than it is in Chile for a range of geopolitical reasons. The Immigration New Zealand Act of 1987 omitted 'source country' migration preference policy, in its place succeeded a migration policy that searched for certain skills, attributes or qualifications. The new policy removed the barrier of the flow for Asian migrants to New Zealand. Circa this time, countries like Japan and China were developing rapidly; their citizens started to be able to afford tickets to overseas destinations, in search for a 'cleaner and safer' lifestyle (Friesen, 2008).

New Zealand has a very close relationship with some Pacific Island countries and Australia. For example, citizens of Australia are guaranteed residence in New Zealand, as long as the applicant is of 'good character' (little- to-no criminal history) (Immigration New Zealand, 2018b). It is expected that migrants that have not applied under the points-based migration system will demonstrate higher rates of unemployment or difficulty obtaining work. Nevertheless, In this paper, the people who move to New Zealand from Australia and the Pacific Islands will not be considered migrants, as the New Zealand Immigration policy does not define them to be so.

Both countries receive many residence visa applications due to their high global development rankings; both are member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Developed states have a tendency to attract migrants from poorer countries; such a flow is termed as 'south to north' migration. Arostegui (2017) reported mayor Rodrigo Delgado Estación Central, a *comuna* (commune) in Santiago stated that "Haitians discovered Chile through soldiers who spread the word of good paying work and social benefits". The movement of people from Haiti to Chile exemplifies the mode of 'south to north migration'

Chile has not always attracted high levels of migrants. For example, during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, Chile was predominantly a 'migration-sender' country; Chileans moved to other countries to seek refuge from Pinochet's regime, or wealthier lifestyle opportunities. Immigrants who came to Chile during Pinochet's dictatorship were few, usually middle-upper class workers who supported or saw opportunity in Pinochet's neoliberal reforms. Since the neoliberal reforms, Chile has experienced high levels of economic growth which has transformed Chile's position from a country located in the global 'south', to the global 'north'.

Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) peoples who dream of an 'American dream' lifestyle - one that promises economic prosperity and associated happiness- are moving to Chile instead of the United States. Migration to Chile is politically more feasible for many LAC peoples compared to the United States. Chile had not updated its *1975 Immigration Act* until earlier this year, in April 2018. The 1975 Immigration Act was built upon nation-state security, more specifically, to prevent people entering that opposed Pinochet's

regime. The Act did not insofar consider migration in terms of ‘search for a better life’, which has caused significant problems for regularization of migrants in Chile today (C. D. Reveco & Levinson, 2012).

New Zealand has been regarded as one of the safest and cleanest places in the world to live in. Unlike Chile, New Zealand has been an immigrant-destination country since the signing of the *Treaty of Waitangi* (1840) (Andresen, 2002 ). New Zealand’s migration policy has been constructed around its high migratory demand. For this reason, New Zealand has greater liberty to ‘pick and choose’ where its migrants come from. Currently, New Zealand has an immigration’s points-based system- where residency is granted to those who gain the most points in categories such as language, qualifications, experience, or financial assets.

In sum, both New Zealand and Chile have been countries highly sought after by immigrants in recent years. New Zealand’s immigration policy has been more adept to its long-standing attractiveness as a destination country for migrants; Chile’s migration policy has only recently been updated to its changed status as an economically developed country.

### *Geography*

The physical geography of a state’s territory determines how many people live and move to the nation-state in question. The physical geography differences between Chile and New Zealand have therefore impacted, and will continue to impact, flow of migration.

Chile is part of a larger continental territory in which there is naturally a larger population. Chile has three bordering neighbours: Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru; all of which share borders with other significant states such as Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. The sharing of borders reduces time and financial costs associated with movement by ground or air which has helped to facilitate migrant flows. On the contrary, New Zealand consists of three small islands. New Zealand has no bordering state territories, and very few populous neighbours. Therefore, migration flows are greater in Chile than in New Zealand (Kritz, Lim, & Zlotnik, 1992, p. 44)

### *The Study*

In this case study, I will be asking three questions which are asked with the purpose of helping the governments of Chile and New Zealand making foreign policy decisions. The research will be based upon the last eight years, 2010 to 2018.

- A. Which countries are the immigrants into Chile and New Zealand coming from?
- B. What kind of careers or work do these immigrants take upon in their destination country?
- C. What factors, such as political or personal factors, influence the differences in what kind of work the immigrants take upon in Chile and New Zealand?

*Employment trends by ethnic group- ‘Ethno-employment’*

This study focuses on what jobs new immigrants are taking up and what factors influence what jobs they obtain. I will be using information received from interviews in conjunction with ‘Country of Origin’ research (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment) to determine factors, such as education level. The hypothesis at present is that there is a clear trend of ‘ethno-employment’- an ‘uneven distribution of ethnicities by industry’ among migrants, based on their ethnic characteristics (Owen, et al. 2015). This hypothesis is based upon the research of Carolina Stefoni (2002), who investigated the role of female Peruvian migrants into Chile. Stefoni determined that the personal attributes of Peruvian women in their new environment, such as a tendency to be more caring and ‘less established’; than Chilean women [sic], led to obtainment of ‘caring’ positions such as nannying or retail positions in the Chilean workforce (pp. 132, 133).

### *Methodology*

This investigation is a qualitative analysis, in which factors that inhibit and encourage certain types of work according to ethnic population are discussed.

An immigrant, in this study, is defined by someone who has moved permanently to a country. This means they obtain a form of formal residency.

New Zealand and Chile have different migrant *tramites* (paperwork), so this study will be analysing migrant jobs in regard to different types of Visa statuses of each country. Furthermore, Chile has more ‘undocumented’ migrants than New Zealand- it is much easier to illegally cross a land border than a mass of sea. Nevertheless, this study will determine immigrant country of origins through governmental and non-governmental institutions (NGOs). For Chile’s data, this will include Police Departamento de Investigaciones (PDI), Ministerio de Migraciones y Interior, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) and the United Nations OIM. For New Zealand, I will be using data from Statistics New Zealand- obtained by the New Zealand Census 2006 and 2013 Census in combination with information obtained from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT), New Zealand Immigration (NZI), and New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE).

In order to determine what types of jobs migrants enter, a series of interviews will be undertaken with immigrants and local agencies from Chile, predominantly in its capital Santiago, where a third of Chile’s population reside. In New Zealand, interviews will be undertaken via internet mediums of communication. Subjects of study will be drawn through personal relations and non-governmental institutions.

The primary working language of this investigation is in English and Spanish *Castellano*. It may be necessary to use a digital or personal translator in some cases: for example, many Haitian migrants to Chile speak limited Spanish, tending to communicate only by their mother tongue, *Creole*. All quotes taken from residents in Chile included in this paper are English translations made by the author<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Original copies of interview recordings are available on request.




Interviewee subjects will be identified by their type of work, length of residence in Chile, and their country of origin. Characteristics such as level of education, age (or approximation of), gender, type of work before migration will be used as variables in the discussion of this investigation. Additional information about the interview respondent will be provided where contextually appropriate. Due to privacy, it is understood that some interviewee subjects may not want to share this information.

Interviews will be recorded by note, voice-recorder, and camera. Each interviewee will be asked if their views can be used in this investigation, which may be published and/or used. Their identity will remain anonymous, unless they have provided explicit permissions otherwise.

A) *From 2010-2018: Where are the immigrants coming from?*

*Chile*



It is not uncommon to hear Chileans say that ‘the face of Chile is changing’ (Al Jazeera English, 2017; Financiero, 2016) “10 years ago, you would have not seen a black person in Santiago. Now you see black person on every (street) corner” (Chilean-born woman, 30s, Santiago). The observations are not uncalled for; from 2005 to 2017, Chile has seen an increase in immigrant population from 1.7% to 2.6% (C. D. Reveco, 2018)

Figure 1- Source: Police Direccion de Investigaciones

Chile’s sources of immigration countries have changed a lot over the last 8 years. Historically, neighbouring Peru has been Chile’s greatest source. As demonstrated in Figure 1, Peru has accounted for 40% of Chile’s immigration for the years 2010-2016. However, employment of Peruvians in Chile has dropped by twelve percent in the last eight years (Table 1). The decrease mostly represents growing numbers of migrants from other LAC countries. Peru’s steepening levels of economic growth and job opportunity has given Peruvians less ‘push factor’- a (usually negative) factor which propels a migrants movement elsewhere- to move their lives to Chile. (Andina, 2018; Central Intelligence Agency, 2018c).

Top 5 country sources for immigrant employment in Chile (%)			
Country	December 2009-Feb 2010	Country2	December 2017-Feb 2018
Peru	50.20%	Peru	28
Argentina	11.4	Colombia	16.5
Colombia	7	Venezuela	9
Bolivia	6	Bolivia	8.2
Ecuador	5.7	Haiti	7.1

Table 1- Source: Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (Bravo, 2018, pp. 2-3).

What is also observed in Table 1<sup>5</sup> is the replacement of Argentina and Ecuador to Venezuela and Haiti on the top five immigrant employment countries. The rise in

Venezuelan (9%) and Haitian (7.1%) immigrants in Chile is caused by respective political and humanitarian crises occurring in these states- a push factor so strong that Venezuelan and Haitian migration may be termed ‘forced migration’, or ‘migration for humanitarian purposes.’ Michelle Bachelet, former President of Chile, opened Chile’s borders to the people in need of a safer home country, indirectly

<sup>5</sup> It must be noted that the data in Table 1 are based on results from the *Encuesta Nacional de Empleo* - those immigrants who have not been employed, of which there are many, are not included in the results

citing the *New Economics of Labour Migration* theory as a reason to pass the progressive migration law reforms (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración, 2017; C. D. Reveco, 2018). Table 1

Research undertaken by the (DEM) (2017, p. 115), reveals that the majority of the migrants into Chile are working-aged. In 2015, 42.2% of visas were granted to people within the 15-29 age bracket, whilst 34.55% were granted to those aged 30-44 years. This means that key issues pertaining to migrants in Chile is strongly related to employment, as opposed to education or retirement.

Table 1 shows that Perú (40%), Colombia (20%), Bolivia (20%) Argentina (7%) have been the average top sources of Chile’s permanent migrants over the last decade. However, looking at data as of current (of which would be more useful to the future purposes of this study ), the top 5 migrant sources for Chile are **Perú, Colombia, Bolivia, Haiti and Venezuela** (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración, 2017).

### *New Zealand*

Table 2

Number and share of overseas-born population by their country of origin, who have been in NZ for under two years (2013 Census data)								
Figure	Pacific Islands	UK & Ireland	Europe (excluding UK and Ireland)	North America	Asia	Middle East & Africa	Australia	Other
Auckland: Number	7,605	7,644	3,864	2,094	35,037	5,328	2,634	1,395
Auckland: % of overseas born population	4	12	6	6	53	8	4	2
Rest of New Zealand: Number	5,919	14,049	5,322	5,050	26,088	4,868	5,919	2,169
Rest of New Zealand: % of overseas born population	9	7	8	6	39	7	9	3

The main source of [skilled] immigration from the last two years in New Zealand derives from Asia (39%). The second primary source of immigration derives from UK and Ireland (21%). North America (6%), Middle East & Africa (7%), Australia (9%), and the Pacific Islands (7%), and ‘other’ (3%) share the rest of the recent migrant population in New Zealand (Ministry of Business, 2016a)

The stereotypes on labour stratification within New Zealand tend to be divided among the migrant Asian population: countries which include (but are certainly not limited to) China, South Korea, Philippines, India, and Fiji. Based on present observations and statistical enquiry, there is less stereotypes among English-speaking migrants, such as those from the United Kingdom or Australia.


Table 3- MBI/NZI

Top five source countries of Skilled Migrant Category (SMC) principal applicants in Auckland FY2010/2011 vs FY2014/2015 (%)		
Source country of principal applicant	2010/2011	2014/2015
India	18	28
China	17	19
United Kingdom	12	9
Philippines	9	8
South Africa	8	6

Top five source countries of Essential Skills workers in Auckland FY2010/2011 vs FY2014/2015 (%)		
Source country of Essential Worker	2010/2011	2014/2015
India	10	21
China	9	10
Fiji	13	10
United Kingdom	11	9
Philippines	10	9

Table 4

Figure 2



Given the motivations for this study (pragmatic), the long-term skilled migrants of NZ, as opposed to the Essential Skill workers, of which are given a two-year term to work in demanded industries in NZ, the labour stratification of the five source countries of SMC principal applicants (average from 2010-2015) will be analysed: this includes **India, China, United Kingdom, Philippines, and South Africa**. This will serve as a basis for comparative analysis with top source origin countries of Chile: **Perú, Bolivia, Haiti, Venezuela and Colombia**.

*B. What kind of careers or work do these immigrants take upon in their destination country?*

*Chile*

Table 5(Departamento de Extranjería y Migración, 2017)

	Perú	Venezuela	Haiti	Bolivia	Colombia
Identified Stereotype <sup>6</sup>	<b>Men:</b> Restaurant owners, chefs, service staff <b>Women:</b> Nanny's, service or retail staff	Service industries: retail or hospitality. Selling goods (remunerative work)	Street vendors, construction workers (men), illicit jobs (Charles, 2018)	Miners- based in the north of Chile Service industries	Customer service: e.g., call centers, retail or hospitality Chefs/cooks Sex workers
Reality	N/A	69% of the Venezuelan population participate in remunerative work: only 40% of which is	Construction work among Haitian males	• 31.1% work in real estate and entrepreneurship	N/A

<sup>6</sup> Stereotypes identified via discussion with Chilean nationals and immigrants and academics specializing in migration

		done via contract (Organizacion Internacional para las Migraciones, 2018) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Of these remunerative workers, 51.2% work in services or selling in markets, 17% in 'elemental jobs', and 8.5% in scientific or intellectual jobs</li> </ul>	Housewives Lack of information regarding these jobs since most are informal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>30.6 work in agriculture (mining or fruit picking)</li> <li>24.1% work in construction</li> <li>7.3% work in hotels or restaurants</li> <li>3.9% work in entrepreneurship</li> <li>3.1% work in transport, communications, warehouse</li> </ul>	
Locality of residence in Chile based on 2015 visa requests	-79.1% of immigrants live in the Santiago Metropolitan region, 7.0% in the Antofagasta region.	80.9% of Venezuelans live in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, 6.4% in Valparaíso	98.4% of Haitians live in the Santiago Metropolitan region	The Bolivian population is more dispersed. Less than 23.1% of the Bolivian migrants to Chile live in the Capital, whilst over 60% live in the North of Chile, in mining towns such as Antofagasta, Tarapacá, Atacama and Arica (PULSO, 2018).	-53.9% live in Santiago Metropolitan region, whilst 27.9% live in Antofagasta

### *New Zealand*

Table 6- New Zealand Immigrant Occupations

	India	China	United Kingdom	Philippines	South Africa
<b>Stereotype</b> <sup>7</sup>	Taxi or Uber drivers, doctors,	Takeaway shop owners, Chinese restaurants, or professionals in finance or business	Diverse jobs-professional. Migrants from UK do not really work in low-level jobs	Supermarket checkout, nurses, call center workers	Diverse jobs-mostly professional. Such as, sales and marketing

<sup>7</sup> Stereotypes identified via discussion with New Zealand nationals and through an anonymous online survey. An example of one of the questions asked is 'Are you able to provide an example of a common stereotype among a NZ migrant's country of origin and the job they are likely to be working in? Responses included: 'Indians-Taxi drivers, supermarkets, dairies, delivery etc for migrants hailing from eastern countries.,' 'Indians - convenience stores and IT' 'Indian working Uber'; 'Indian / Chinese - in a dairy'. Comments for United Kingdom included 'The poms (English) who work in professional jobs are really good. Like, I know one surgeon who is probably the best surgeon at Waikato Hospital. I think they come here to get away from their climate.' There were no remarks made for South African population in New Zealand.

<b>Actualities – top 3 occupations (Friesen, 2008; McMillan, 2016; Ministry of Business, 2016a)</b>	SMC: Hospitality, engineering, food trade workers (bakers and pastry cooks- café and restaurant managers, chefs), ICT, business professionals  Electro-technology and Telecommunications Trades Workers  ESW: Hospitality (food trades, chef), ICT Professionals, Engineering and ICT sciences	SMC: Advertising and Marketing Professionals, Food trade workers (bakers and pastry cooks, chefs, café and restaurant managers); Design Engineering and Transport Professionals  ESW: Hospitality, Retail and Service Manager; Engineering, ICT and Science Technicians; Business, Human Resource and Marketing Professionals	SMC: Advertising and Marketing Professionals  ESW: Health Professionals, Specialist Managers, Restaurant Managers	SMC: Health Professionals (Esp. Registered Nurses)  Electrotechnology and Telecommunications Trades Workers  ESW (Temporary): Construction, automotive and trades professionals, registered nurses, carpenters and joiners	SMC: Specialist Managers  ESW: Business, Human Resources and Marketing Professionals, Specialist Managers, ICT Professionals, s
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In a 2010-2015 survey conducted by Ministry of Business (2017, pp. 7-8), it was found that three-quarters of ‘skilled’ migrants were satisfied with their employment. Almost 8 out of 10 employed migrants in New Zealand found that their job matched or partly their skillset or qualifications, however this number has decreased since 2012. The report also found that overseas-born population in Auckland are more likely to be unemployed than other New Zealand migrants. (Ministry of Business, 2016a, p. 2)

### *C. What factors, such as political or personal factors, influence the differences in what kind of work the immigrants take upon in Chile and New Zealand?*

Based on interview analysis, the key barriers for immigrants to New Zealand in obtaining professional jobs were:

1. Lack of relevant NZ work experience
2. English language difficulty
3. Qualification or skill transferability issues
4. Discrimination
5. Migration policy

Identified key barriers for immigrants to Chile in obtaining professional jobs

1. Spanish language difficulty (particularly for Haitian migrants)
2. Migration policy- visa regulation
3. Location- city migrants versus rural migrants
4. Discrimination
5. Qualification or skill transferability issues
6. Lower levels of education exhibited in recent migrant flows to Chile

Many of the above factors to employment are intersectional, hence, this paper has narrowed the factors down to four key discussion points. First, **discrimination** based on ethnic appearance, nationality, or the level of integration (into destination community) will be discussed. The second point will cover **policy**, arguably the most determining factor of immigrants' employment in Chile and New Zealand. The third discussion will cover **language and education factors**, which is discussed more at depth for immigrants in Chile than New Zealand. This is because New Zealand migration policy requires all migrants to have a certain level of education, skill, and English language. Finally, the fourth point will cover **geographic segregation**, both inter- and intra-regional, as means and ends to the stratification of labour among ethnicities. The conclusion at the end of these discussion points intertwines recommendations for each factor to improve diversification of labour among new migrants in Chile and New Zealand.

#### *Discussion point one: Discrimination*

New Zealand and Chile have employment laws that prohibit discrimination based on sex, race, sexual orientation, and age; however, this does not mean that employers do not such factors as an important factor for prospective employees (United Nations, 1990). In the context of this paper, discrimination based on ethnicity (racism) is an obvious discussion point. For example, immigrant restaurant owners in both New Zealand and Chile will often employ people who are from the same country of origin. Following this, the perception that *'only Indians work in Indian restaurants'* (New Zealand-born citizen, 35, teacher) non-

directly limits other ethnicities applying for jobs in certain industries. Hence, discrimination occurs both at the employer and applicant end, which contributes to the stratification of ethnicities in certain labour industries.

Immigrants interviewed for this paper did not mention racism as a barrier to obtaining a job, citing other barriers such as policy and qualifications as more significant factors their employment process. However, literature reveals that racism does indeed act as a barrier to immigrant inclusion, and by proxy, rights to employment. A New Zealand university student respondent, for example, stated the following: *“I work in a supermarket and we have had some customers come in and abuse the Indian and Asian women for stealing jobs...”*

Following this, a hypothesis presents itself that it is not the country of origin that perpetuates racism, rather the level to which the immigrant has integrated into the country of origin. For example, Spoonley and Gendall (2010) in New Zealand, ‘racism’ in the workplace was more so attributed to how long the migrant had been in New Zealand; immigrants who had lived in New Zealand for longer periods of time were less likely to report racism as a factor that affected their employment (Spoonley & Gendall, 2010). The longer length of period of stay, the more likely the immigrant would have integrated in the country of origin; having better established language, housing, culture, or secure employment. One of the Colombian immigrant interviewees relayed that it was her informal classification as a ‘contributor to society’ that made her less subject to racism:

Interviewer: What has been your experience in terms of racism in Chile?

*Respondent: For me, I have not experienced racism. Everything has been okay. But I think it is because I came here, already with a good job. I am seen to be contributing to society” (Female, 20s, social worker, 4 years in Chile)*

Hence, local networks and integration is a significant contributor to immigrant discrimination, as opposed to solely racism as its own ends.






Figure 3 (Source: self-elaboration)

Discrimination is an intersectional variable in which it is hard to denote causality. As denoted by Figure 3, racism is a factor that affects integration into the destination community, and by proxy, has an effect on employment into certain jobs. Haitian immigrants in Chile are particularly subject to racism based on (ethnic) appearance because their dark skin tone contrasts the ‘white European’ or ‘mestizo’ appearances prominent in Chile. Segovia, Ramirez-Aguilar, and Zapata-Sepúlveda (2018) quoted a female Afro-Colombian immigrant to the north of Chile “*I have been denied work lots of times, as well, because of the colour of my skin*” (trans). The study concluded that there is most definitely a preference for ‘European’ or ‘white’ appearances in employment over more ‘Latin’ or ‘afro’ appearances, which will in turn affect the amount to which the immigrant be seen as a ‘contributor’ to society. Nevertheless, the extent to which discrimination against ethnic appearance has affected employment has been, and will remain to be, a very difficult variable to measure due to its intersectional nature.

The enquiry into New Zealand immigrant occupations (Table 6) demonstrates that it is ethnicities do indeed take upon a range of jobs; more that some jobs are usually occupied by certain ethnic groups. Take, for example: Indian *Uber* drivers in New Zealand, or Peruvian nannies in Chile. The domination of ethnicities in a certain industry gives us a false sense that these ethnic groups can *only* take up these kinds of jobs. This false sense, what Urzúa (2018) has termed ‘micro-discrimination’, can lead to a predetermined destiny for many of the immigrants that arrive in Chile.

Micro-discrimination is a barrier for immigrants obtaining high-skilled jobs, at both the employer and applicant end. For example, when one of the interview subjects was a Venezuelan woman, who had arrived into Chile four years ago. She worked as manager of one of the largest private companies in Chile. She stated that clients and her co-workers were often surprised she was Venezuelan- and not Chilean- because of the job she worked in. Her situation presents two conceivable situations that may have affected her employment: an employer who had a pre-disposed idea that ‘Venezuelan women only work in hospitality’ might have subconsciously overlooked a senior-role application from a Venezuelan woman.

On the other hand, a Venezuelan woman may hesitate to apply for a senior position for the same micro-discriminatory ideas.

The barrier of micro-discrimination is less obvious than other barriers described in this paper, such as language, qualification and visas. Nevertheless, micro-discrimination hinders new immigrants from obtaining jobs that do not fit their 'national stereotype'. A challenge for Chile and New Zealand is to reduce laboural stereotypes attributed to certain ethnicities, since new flows immigrants -especially younger cohorts- will eventually take on ways of respective education, culture and languages, provided that government and NGO efforts to integrate immigrants remain consistent. Professional employment among new immigrants is possible, provided that racism and micro-discrimination do not prevail.

### *Discussion point two: Policy*

The drivers and regulators of migratory movement strongly influence what jobs are obtained by immigrants. In this discussion point, the policies of Chile and New Zealand will be analysed into how they have affected stratification of labour among new immigrants. A coherent immigration policy will be built around not only the country's domestic circumstances, but its position in the global system. The analysis concludes that Chile's policy lacks development given its new-found attractiveness as a destination country for LAC migrants reasons. New Zealand's policy is coherent; job stratification among ethnicities is more related to small or segregated social-networks.

The majority of recent migratory movements to Chile and New Zealand represent the phenomenon of 'south' to 'north' migration. In other words, migrants from less economically developed nations will move to New Zealand and Chile for their relatively prosperous economies in their respective regions. Following this, a lot of Chile and New Zealand's migration policy fits under the migration paradigm 'New Economics of Labour Theory' (NELT), which is elaborated below in Table 7. New Zealand's historic position as a destination-country has meant that New Zealand's immigration policy developed and coherent; New Zealand "picks and chooses" its migrants based on their skills, language, character and prospective employment under a points-based system. The cohesive Immigration Act (2009) almost certainly guarantees employment to all recent migrants to New Zealand- with the exception of those who arrive under family-support visas. Such a certainty is beneficial to both the migrant and New Zealand society (Immigration New Zealand, 2018c). Stable employment of the new migrant prevents ethnic stratification and resentment that tends to follow immigrant unemployment or informal employment.

What is most important in the discussion of policy is that Chile's Immigration Act- up until April of 2018- was unprepared to receive the wave of forcefully displaced migrants from Venezuela and Haiti. Humanitarian movement to of this extent has not been experienced in New Zealand, therefore, comparison between the countries' humanitarian visa policies will not be discussed in this paper. However, the ways in which New Zealand policy has facilitated employment of migrants may be applied to the migration crisis that confronts Latin American region today.

Table 7- Relevant migration theories

New Economics of Labour Theory	Humanitarian movement	Dual (Segmented) Market Theory
<p>Many governments seek migrants to contribute to the economy. One of the modern flows of migration... 'sees migration as a response to relative deprivation, not absolute poverty' (Castles, de Haas, &amp; Miller, 2014), meaning that migrants have made conscious, calculable decisions to migrate to another place for the economic benefit of themselves or their family. More often than not, only the skilled worker is permitted entry into the country. Dependents (often partners or children) are not permitted. Therefore, the migrant worker will send remittances back to their family who live in their country of origin.</p>	<p>Van Hear in his book <i>New Diasporas</i> (1998: 1) explains humanitarian or forced movement as 'migrants who have moved to better their lives or to escape persecution are prominent in the much noticed growth of forced migration worldwide.' Particularly during the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Chile was a migrant source country for those fleeing Pinochet's dictatorship. Since then, Chile's position in the world system has flipped; Chile has recently been on the receiving end of Venezuelan and Haitian migrants who have moved to better their lives or to escape persecution.</p>	<p>New Zealand's migration policy resonates key arguments of Piore's (1979) 'Dual Labour (or segmented) Market Theory'. To quote Castles et al. (2014, p. 35), the theory states that 'demand for high and low-skilled labour is structurally embedded in modern capitalist economies...domestic supply for low-skilled labour [in OECD economies] has dramatically decreased because many women have entered the formal labour market, and youngsters continue education for much longer...'. This theory provides a well-founded argument to why new migrants take on certain types of jobs.</p>

*Building policy around reasons of movement:*

*New Zealand*

New Zealand is an advanced capitalist society where government interests, and therefore its migration policy, is based around supply and demand (self-regulation) of the public and private sectors. This means that New Zealand residency is usually granted where skills are 'short-of-supply', resulting in migrant immigrant circumstances that resonate Piore's 'Segmented Market Theory' (Table 7). For example, as evident in Table 6- New Zealand Immigrant Occupations, Chinese and Indian immigrants (who make up 61% of New Zealand's recent SMC flows) work in 'low-skilled' employment, such as call-centres, cooks, waiters, or taxi/*Uber* drivers. Nevertheless, a fair proportion of these migrants also work in high-skilled jobs, such as doctors, financial experts, or entrepreneurs (Cunliffe, 2004; Gamlen, 2010). It is in this instance where the Segmented Market Theory is exhibited; 'middle-road' jobs are occupied by existing NZ nationals leaving no remaining demand for migrants to occupy these types of jobs. Another more specific example of supply and demand of immigrants is provided in the Christchurch construction worker example below:

In 2011, Christchurch- which is the second largest city in New Zealand after Auckland- was struck by two earthquakes. The damage that followed the earthquakes instigated a '*dire need for construction workers and engineers*' (McMillan, 2016, p. 26). Immigration New Zealand- a state agency- responded

by seeking workers from overseas. In the couple of years following the Christchurch earthquake, Filipinos, of whom were predominantly male, made up 30 percent of migrants who came to New Zealand to work.

The Christchurch construction worker example perfectly exhibits NELT theory. NELT is seen to be mutually beneficial for both sending and receiving countries: New Zealand benefits by meeting industry demands with (relatively) cheap and abundant labour. For example, if the state of New Zealand were to ignore the demands for construction workers in Christchurch after the earthquake, the city's redevelopment would have been stalled. Furthermore, incoming migrants- such as the Filipino construction workers- are generally guaranteed a better standard of living, or higher wages than that of their country of origin (Castles et al., 2014, p. 37).

New Zealand	Chile
<p>Over 70% of migrants to New Zealand arrive under the skilled worker or business stream. (MigrationStats, 2018; Ministry of Business, 2016a, p. 12):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Skilled worker or business stream (70%<sup>9</sup>)</li> <li>• Family stream (21%)</li> <li>• Humanitarian/international programme (9%)</li> </ul>	<p>Temporary Visa types include working visas MERCOSUR family/relation visas, religious, retirement or rentier, investment/commercial, pregnant and medical treatment, laboural motivations, ex-resident and civil union</p> <p>Types of temporary Visas in Chile (2015)<sup>10</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sujeto a contrato (Subject to contract): 12.4%</li> <li>• Temporaria (Temporary): 86.3%</li> <li>• Estudiante (Student): 1.3%</li> </ul>

Overall, while New Zealand's NELT immigration policy may be critiqued for the tendency to attribute certain work industries to immigrant populations, the policy recognises New Zealand's position in the global system as a highly developed country. Hence, this paper views New Zealand's policy to be adept to the drivers of its immigration, making the process of immigration coherent and mostly successful.

### *Chile*

Chile is the most economically developed state in Latin America. It is for this reason that the *New Economics of Labour Market Theory* resonates (LAC) migrants' pull-factor to Chile. However, Chile's immigration policy does not reflect the aforementioned circumstances. Chile's immigration policy, up until this year, has been held to the Immigration Act of 1975 -an Immigration Act constructed under Pinochet's dictatorship. At this time, Chile was known to be more of a 'sender' country than that of a destination. Hence, this Act was based around attracting migrants to work, to support basic development of the place. In 2008, then-President Michelle Bachelet signed 'Presidential Directive No.9' which became also known as the 'policy of no policy.' Bachelet cited themes of international human rights as basis for

<sup>9</sup> The percentages represent successful applicants for NZ permanent residence from 2010-2018, according to data from Statistics NZ

<sup>10</sup> Very limited data is available for visas for humanitarian /programme purposes, since the humanitarian visa category was only established earlier this year (2018) in April. Hence, the majority of recent migrants into Chile have entered through one of these three categories.

the continuation of Chile's continuing to welcome of migrants throughout Latin America (C. D. Reveco, 2018).

A Peruvian restaurant owner (male, 28, 8 years in Chile), in the high-end Vitacura *comuna* of Santiago most profoundly stated that *"Chile is a land of opportunity."* His sentiments are shared with the rest of the new migrants to Chile.

The first term of President Piñera's administration stated that migrants' contribution to social, cultural and economic development to Chile was key ideology posited in the government immigration policy- hence, no further amendments were made to the 1975 Act. Furthermore Piñera's government cited that low-skilled migrants would push [Chilean] women into higher-skilled jobs in the workforce- a form of horizontal demographic metabolism<sup>11</sup>(Gobierno de Chile, 2012; Lutz, 2012; C. a. D. Reveco & Mullan, 2014). In 2018, Piñera updated the Immigration Act to regularize the large flows of Haitian and Venezuelan migrants. Before this date, Chile did not have a Visa category for forced migration movements (see: Table 7).

Like New Zealand, many immigrants move to Chile because wages are higher than their country of origin. Also, the private and public institutions in Chile are more developed than a lot of those in other parts of the LAC region, providing immigrants with to develop human capital attributes (qualifications, language, social networks) better than they would in their country of origin. Therefore, incoming migrants will be pre-calculated economic decision to migrate to Chile in search for better economic opportunity. Such motivations are discernible in the following quote from a Peruvian minimarket owner:

*"I work very hard- from seven in the morning until twelve at night...the hours of work in Perú are not the same... there is less work in Perú... as well, the economy of Perú is low."* (late 20s, male, Santiago)

Difficult visa requirements are the result of consistently high number of requests to live in New Zealand; in 2017, the country was ranked second in the world for prosperity<sup>12</sup> (Legatum Institute, 2017). New Zealand has consistently achieved top rankings in safety and living indices. Hence, especially in comparison to Chile, New Zealand immigration demands more- in terms of qualifications and personal skills- from temporary and permanent residence applicants. For example, Indians, Chinese and Filipinos who have learnt English, or have been among the top scholarly achievers in their place of origin, will be the ones to most often meet the requirements needed to work in New Zealand. These high-achieving immigrants come to New Zealand for higher wages or to be situated in a more desirable lifestyle than they would have in their country of origin. One Filipino nurse (30s, male), who arrived to work in New Zealand in 2011 commented:

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<sup>11</sup> The key idea of Demographic Metabolism to predict socio-economic change based upon multi-dimensional mathematical demography. The relevance of this idea in this paper relays Lutz (2012, p. 288) Proposition Number 3: *"transitions may occur not only to another state inside the system but also to an absorbing state (death) or to a state outside the system (out-migration). new individuals arriving (through birth or in-migration) will be instantly allocated to one state within the system. not all transitions among a given set of states may be possible. Sometimes transitions are only possible in one direction, such as from lower to higher educational categories or from the single to the married state, from which people may move to the divorced or widowed state."*

*“There was a lot of competition as well as way back in the mid 2000s even until today... Filipino youths that study nursing have the eventual goal of going abroad to look for a brighter future.”*

Advanced neoliberal states, like New Zealand and Chile today, perceive immigrants with high-level qualifications- such as university degrees- as beneficial to the economy. This is because highly-skilled, working aged migrants contribute to the local economy without draining state services designed to benefit either youth (education) or pensioners (care).

In Chile, the news flows of migrants from the top 5 countries are less qualified than the Chileans and are therefore observed to be working in ‘lower-skilled’ jobs. Hence, dual segmented labour in Chile is less evident than in New Zealand: this comes down to its immigration policy, which is not as demanding as New Zealand’s. One may argue that Chile is less able to demand certain skills from migrants, since it was ranked 33rd on the Legatum Prosperity Index in 2017 (New Zealand came second)<sup>13</sup>. Nevertheless, Chile still receives a lot of residency requests simply because of the more populous and less economically developed region in which it is situated (Instituto Católico Chileno de Migración, 2018)

Chile’s working visa process is significantly less coherent than New Zealand’s. This investigation has found that the lack of coherence is a significant factor into why recent immigrants to Chile will enter certain types of jobs- usually informal. One of the Venezuelan interview respondents (20s) spoken to worked selling cell phone accessories in the *comuna* Estación Central. He was well travelled and qualified in electrical engineering- New Zealand immigration policy may have even considered him to be a person of ‘high-skill’- qualified in an area of skill-shortage- and of ‘good character’. The gentleman arrived in Chile only one month ago, having only moved because of the democratic crisis in Venezuela. When asked why he was not working in Electrical engineering he responded: *“I need to order my papers”* implying that he had sort out his visa status to be allowed to legally earn money in Chile.

To order papers has been a difficult process for many, which has been slightly made easier by Piñera’s Immigration Act change in 2018 (Bravo, 2018). Nevertheless, the process of regularization remain incoherent, complicated, leaving many (invalid) immigrants working in low-skilled labours. For example, many LAC migrants to Chile arrive on a tourist visa which has a validity of up to 90 days. From there, they request a *‘sujeto a contrato’* (subject to contract) visa, which allows the applicant to stay and work for up to two years with proof of a valid work contract that promises a USD\$520 monthly salary. For reference, New Zealand’s minimum monthly salary is over five times this amount; living and food costs are more or less similar between both countries (see: Table 8). After two years of *sujeto a contrato*, the immigrant can request for permanent residency, or they will return to their country of origin.

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<sup>13</sup> The index measures ‘prosperity’ factors such as economic equality, education, personal freedom, social capital and environment

One of the many problems with the Chile's visa process is that companies often demand a Chilean RUT (national identity) number- of which you cannot get without a *sujeto a contrato* or *temporaria* visa. A recent Colombian (50s, male, arrived five months ago, factory worker, Santiago) stated:

*“Moving here is hard because you cannot get one without the other {RUT and Visa}. I was lucky I had a friend here, who owns a business. A very nice, genuine guy. Very nice. He made me a ‘work contract’ so I could apply for the Sujeto a Contrato Visa, get my RUT so I could apply for [legitimate] jobs. While I waited for my RUT I went back to Colombia for a few months. I told my wife that she can come with me once I got a job in Chile. But she left before me anyway... to be with our daughter that lives here [in Chile].”*

Type of Visa	New Zealand ( <i>Immigration New Zealand, 2018a</i> )	Chile
Working/Permanent Residency	<p>Apart from Business and Investor visas, there are two primary visa categories for those who want to gain residence in New Zealand: <b>Essential Skills Worker</b> and <b>Skilled Migrant Category</b></p> <p>Under these two visa categories, there are many types of Visas: for example, ‘Specific Work Purpose Visa, Long-term skill-shortage Visa List, short-term skill shortage list, Talent visa, China Skilled Workers Visa<sup>14</sup>, Post Study Work Visa, Philippines Skilled Workers Visa<sup>15</sup>, Republic of Korea Special Work Visa<sup>16</sup> to name a few.</p> <p><i>Requirements:</i> Needs to have an offer of job in an industry that lacks supply</p> <p>Certain level of English needed</p> <p>Qualifications that are transferable</p> <p>Skilled Worker Visa types must earn (at least) above NZD\$23.49 per hour. Some visa requirements require the migrant to earn above NZD\$35.24 per hour (<i>approximately USD\$2500 monthly</i>) Such a requirement significantly reduces the worker exploitation or low-skilled segmentation among immigrants.</p>	<p><b>Visa Sujeto a Contrato:</b> Contract visa, this visa is issued upon presentation of a contract with a Chilean employer. The work contract must offer a monthly salary over \$350,000 Chilean pesos (<i>approximately USD\$520</i>), which is a basic figure which barely covers Chilean living and food costs for the worker.</p> <p><b>Visa Temporaria:</b> Temporary visa (normally 1 year) for professionals with tertiary qualification, and a job offer. A temporary visa can also be obtained through the ‘Visa Estudiante’ (student visa).</p> <p><b>Permanencia Definitiva:</b> Permanent visa option for foreigners who have lived in Chile for 2 years with a temporary visa. These applicants need to prove they can financially support themselves.</p>
Humanitarian/international responsibility	<p>Annual quota for people from Western Samoa, Niue, Tokelau, and Cook Islanders</p> <p>Those drawn in the ballot are granted residence given proof of a job offer that will financially support themselves and their family, and they can speak, write and read an adequate level of English.</p>	<p>Democratic Responsibility Visa for Venezuelans (created April 2018). There are no requirements for this Visa, only that it must be obtained in the Consulate of Chile in Venezuela in order to reduce <i>tramites</i> when the migrant arrives to Chile.</p>
Family	<p>Must prove stable relationship with partner/child/dependent</p> <p>Family accepted on a points-based system. All approved applicants need to prove a sufficient standard of English (through the International English Language Testing System )</p>	<p>Family Reunification Visa for Haitians (limited to 10,000 per annum)</p>

Table 8- Types of Visa



The Colombian respondent demonstrates that the problem is not just in the process to get a job or a Visa in Chile, but of how long it takes to get a Visa. Another interview respondent stated:

*“To be a migrant... it is not easy... First you need to go to Extranjería (foreign office)- the process... given that there are more immigrants the process is more slow. And as well, the information has been updated, but because there are too many [immigrants], the process is slow. Following this it makes it difficult to get a job.” (Venezuelan, male, church helper, 30s, Santiago Metropolitan Region.)*

The immigration policy of Chile has made it difficult for Latin American immigrants to arrive and work in their preferred types of jobs when they first arrive. There is only one office where one can validate their papers, which is located in Santiago. Applicants sleep on the street overnight to reduce the average ten hour wait time to approximately six hours. One Australian immigrant spoken to in this line had paid a contractor to reserve a spot in line from four in the morning, where the contractor would then text him to let the applicant know he was near the office, approximately eight or more hours later. The new law change has significantly reduced the queues outside the *extranjeria*, but it still requires one to three months to regularize papers and receive permission to book an appointment to *apply* for the visa. Migrants spoken to who had moved to Chile during the years 2015-2017 relayed that the average waiting times were six to twelve months. The absolute incoherence of Chile’s immigration policy causing large queues at immigration offices is difficult enough on its own, without mentioning the cost of commuting to immigration offices or losing a days’ worth of work. Therefore, ‘illegitimate entry’ (clandestine) is associated with informal work (Bravo, 2018) .

To sum, to create a coherent immigration policy, the drivers of immigration need to be addressed. New Zealand’s migration policy has been created under assumptions of supply and demand, since most of its migrants moving for NELT. This has resulted in the ‘points-based system’ for those who wish to live or work in New Zealand. Chile also has many immigrants moving for reasons based on NELT, but there has been next to no requisites or points-based system for migrants. For example, immigrants to Chile do not need a required language (Spanish) level, suitable qualification, skills or salary: only a job offer (see: *Sujeto a Contrato*, Table 7), which as demonstrated by an interview respondent, can be made clandestinely. Piñera’s administration has reasoned that migrants who take up lower-skilled jobs will leave opportunity for Chileans to take higher-skilled jobs. Given the new waves of forced migrants from Venezuela and Haiti, the result of Chile’s ‘policy of no policy’ has been the secularisation of recent migrants taking upon low-skilled and informal work, such as cooks, *Uber* drivers, street sellers.

### *Discussion point three: Laboral attributes: language and qualifications*

#### *Chile*

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<sup>14</sup> For chefs, traditional medicine practitioner, Wushu martial arts coach, Mandarin teacher’s aide or tour guide

<sup>15</sup> For registered nurses, farm workers and engineering professionals

<sup>16</sup> This visa does not have designated job types like China or the Philippines

English is considered the international *lingua franca*. The ability to speak fluent English is considered an asset in many parts of the world. In Chile, English is only considered an asset in international companies and organizations; it is not necessarily a requisite to obtaining a high-skilled job. This is because very few Chilean people speak English; Spanish is the *lingua franca* in Chile.

Many of Chile's Latin American neighbours speak Spanish (the only exception being Brazil) which helps facilitate the integration of Latin American immigrants into Chilean society. Nevertheless, Chile is experiencing large flows from Haiti in recent years- a movement which poses to be more difficult than migration from Chile's Latin American immigrants, since Haitian migrants speak Creole ('Krey-ole')- a French-sounding language derived from Haiti's French colonial history.

Haitian respondents for this paper preferred to speak English over Spanish, most likely due to Americanization that spread to Haiti; learning English would have been valued over learning Spanish. The interviewer found that many of the Haitian respondents asked: "*Do you speak English?*" or "*Can we speak in English [instead of Spanish]?*"

Andrea Bennet, President of *Fundación Viña San Bernardo* stated:

*"In general, the jobs they [Haitians] take up are very basic- waiters... because of the language and because their academic credentials are not valid here in Chile. So, we have teachers, engineers, housewives... it is most necessary for them [the Haitian immigrants] to learn Spanish [to obtain a job]."*

The complete lack of spoken native language will lead to either the lack of formal job obtainment, or lower-skilled jobs. Many Haitian immigrants need only very basic Spanish to sell chocolates or fruits on the streets ( a common laboural stereotype), nor to be construction workers. Therefore, language is the primary workforce barrier Haitian immigrants to Chile face to obtain more formal, or higher-skilled labours.

Education is another intersectional variable, a key part of human capital, which factors significantly into the obtainment of certain job types. This study distinguishes between qualifications as their own ends (e.g., secondary school completion), and qualifications that are *transferable* to the destination country. We can analyse such differences by comparing the education of Peruvian<sup>24</sup> and Venezuelan immigrants to Chile:

Venezuelan immigrants to Chile have high levels of education. Under the late Hugo Chavez Presidency (1993-2013), free higher education became a constitutional right (Muhr & Verger, 2014).

Latest research from the Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (2018), has revealed that Venezuelan migrants to Chile have usually worked in higher-skilled industries: scientists and intellectuals made up 30% of occupation in Venezuela, and 30% in retail and services. When moving to Chile, they encounter two core barriers into obtaining their job of desire: transferability of their Venezuelan qualifications to Chile, and the regularization of their papers (see Discussion Point 1: Policy)

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<sup>24</sup> Conclusions from the Peruvian analysis is similar to what is seen in Bolivian and Colombian immigrants to Chile

*“I am a trained medical veterian in my country. I studied...I was professional, and now that I am here [in Chile], I start from practically zero.”*

*We had very, very good education in Venezuela... some of the best universities. But now, everything has been undone; mostly because of the situation that we were living in Venezuela. Now the education is bad, this includes the universities- we no longer have an alumnus. The best teachers have gone, professionals have gone looking- of course- for a much better life. (Venezuelan immigrant, church helper, 4 years in Santiago, woman, 50+)*

Instead of working in the jobs they qualified in, Venezuelan migrants in Chile typically work in hospitality, food service delivery, *uber* drivers, or spa therapists. In fact, Venezuelans have been welcomed by Chilean employers since Venezuelan’s have a positive reputation of being physically attractive, attentive, and friendly:

*“The majority of them (Venezuelans) are very prepared. The people are professional, have professional experience, they are very educated, a lot of them speak English and are very intelligent.” (Chilean resident)*

In general, Peruvians do not hold a high level of education like the Venezuelans. The Peruvian government has only contributed an average of three percent of its GDP towards education over the period from 2000-2014 (which has only recently climbed to four percent); in comparison, Venezuela spent 6.9% of its GDP on education in 2009 (The World Bank Group, 2018). A poor level of education is a key factor as to why many Peruvians work in informal entrepreneurial activities both inside and outside their own country, such as fruit or vegetable selling, hairdressing, or cooking. Peruvians with higher levels of education moved to Chile during the late years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; new flows of Peruvian migrants to Chile come from the higher-skilled sector of Peruvian nationals. However, these Peruvian migrants are marginalised in their destination countries since their education is not internationally competitive. In 2012, for example, the Programme for International Student Assessment marked Peru as the worst performing country in student performance of maths, reading, and science (Development, 2018). Peruvian education has improved in recent years, but current students are not yet old to be part of the new flows of migrants to Chile. Hence, ‘highly-skilled’ Peruvian migrants will often enter informal or ‘low-skilled’ industries in Chile.

The comparison between Venezuelan and Peruvian education highlights two key barriers in education. The first is the invalidity of qualifications that migrants bring from their home country to Chile. The second is the inferiority of skills of qualifications of other LAC countries to Chile, considered Chile is the most economically developed country in its region. Finally, the Haitian migrant population are significantly hindered in their ability to obtain high-level jobs because they do not speak the *lingua franca* of Chile, whereas the other four LAC migrant populations do.

*New Zealand*

The New Zealand Ministry of Business (2016a, pp. 7-8) reports a survey which found that migrants who found difficulty in obtaining work referenced a lack of NZ work experience (38%) and English language as key barriers (23%). Interestingly, 22% cited that their skills or experience were 'not accepted by NZ employers.' Migrants to New Zealand are required to pass a certain level of English which means the language barrier to obtain quality work less apparent than Chile.

*"English is a difficult barrier for a lot of Filipino nurses. For those that are unable to pass the IELTS exam, going to the Middle East was an option." (Filipino nurse, Auckland)*

The primary barrier that immigrant non-native English speakers face is more to do with the level of English comprehension and accent:

*"His [a University professor] Indian accent is so strong. I can hardly understand him. I don't know how he was allowed to teach at a New Zealand uni" (New Zealand politics and religious studies student, 20)*

Out of all the major migrant groups, Chinese are less likely to communicate English well. Analysis of the most recent Census data (2013) shows that approximately one quarter of Chinese migrants cannot speak English, whilst Indians and Filipinos, by comparison, have non-English rates of five to seven percent and one to two percent respectively (Ho, 2015, p. 106). Difficulty with communicating in English most likely determines why there are strong stereotypes of 'Chinese takeaway shop workers' and 'Indian Uberdrivers': these migrant populations are those who have most difficulty with English will tend to fill jobs in which fluent English is not a requirement.

The language variable is intersectional: not being able to speak destination country's common language is linked to a smaller social network, from which follows a series of negative effects for wellbeing and satisfactory employment. Spoonley and Carina (2009, p. 2) of Asia New Zealand report: *"Many immigrant business owners we interviewed are satisfied with their migration to New Zealand, but there are others who feel frustrated, lonely and unhappy. English language difficulties are a common cause of frustration and discontent."*

However, the main point is that not many New Zealand immigrants feel like their employment circumstances do not fit their skills or experience: eight out of ten New Zealand working-age migrants are satisfied with their employment situation. Therefore, New Zealand immigrants obtain more diverse types of work, in comparison to Chile.

### *Summary*

There is little doubt that transferability of qualifications, language or skills are significant factors that determine the (non-)obtainment formal or high-skilled jobs. The key difference between Chile and New Zealand is the level of policy in which regulates the language capabilities and qualification levels of *migrants granted residency*. New Zealand only grants working visas to those who have good job prospects, as weighted by the New Zealand's 'points' system, which strongly factors language and qualification levels into its equation. Chile, up until recently, has not required migrants to have specific skill sets, qualifications, or language levels (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración, 2018). It is found that migrant populations who find difficulty in navigating the destination country's *lingua franca*, or that lack an

internationally-recognised qualification, such as the Chinese in New Zealand, or the Haitians in Chile, will occupy low-skilled or informal jobs.

Since many existing migrants granted residency in Chile have not validated their qualifications—particularly those who have moved for humanitarian reasons—, it is recommended that the Chilean state and IGOs (Inter-Governmental Organisations) look into funding or providing qualification validation and language schools. New Zealand could also benefit in providing language schools for the quarter of the Chinese migrant population that find English difficult. Such a progressive policy will be difficult to appeal to public opinion, whose interests are tend to be situated in the present, as opposed to the future. Nevertheless, from a long-term point perspective, a higher-skilled and formal working (migrant) population will prevent system collapse, dependence on social welfare, and following resentment directed towards certain migrant ethnic groups.

### *Discussion Point Four: Inter- and intra-regional geographies of stratification (within a state)*

#### *Inter-regional*

Ethnic neighbourhoods, a form of geographic segregation, are significant causes and consequences of the stratification of labour in Chile and New Zealand. Ethnic neighbourhoods refers to the concentration of one ethnic group in a place, either at the inter-regional (state) level or the intra-regional level. In the context of this paper, ethnic neighbourhoods are seen to be problematic, since they inhibit wider social networks that facilitate employment.

Ethnic segregation also perpetuates certain industrial sectors according to ethnicity. Take, for example, Chinese precincts of Chinese restaurants. Los Angeles (USA) has been the geographers’ classic exemplar of where ethnic clustering is prominent, but such a phenomenon is becoming more apparent throughout the world due to increasing movements of globalisation and urbanization. This paper concludes that high immigration flows are driving ethnic clustering throughout New Zealand and Chile, which is defining

	Perú	Venezuela	Haiti	Bolivia	Colombia
Locality of residence in Chile based on 2015 visa applications (Departamento de Extranjería y Migración, 2017)	79.1% of immigrants live in the Santiago Metropolitan region, 7.0% in the Antofagasta region.	80.9% of Venezuelans live in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, 6.4% in Valparaíso	98.4% of Haitians live in the Santiago Metropolitan region	Less than 23.1% of the Bolivian migrants to Chile live in the Capital. Over 60% live in the North of Chile, in mining towns such as Antofagasta, Tarapacá, Atacama and Arica.	~53.9% live in Santiago Metropolitan region, whilst 27.9% live in Antofagasta

what jobs incoming immigrants obtain (Spoonley & Carina, 2009; Xue, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 2011).

*Table 9- Inter-regional stratification among ethnic groups in Chile*

Immigrants in New Zealand and Chile tend to reside in certain regions based on their country of origin (inter-regional segregation). Primary reasons for this segregation are job opportunity, climate, or family and friend factors. In Chile, for example, a good proportion of the Bolivian (60%) and Colombian (~30%)

populations live and work to the north of Santiago, in wealthy mining regions such as Antofagasta. Reasons for moving to regions outside Santiago was that they had family and friend connections in the mining regions, as well as, mining jobs offered substantial pay.

*“Colombians come to Chile because of the money change. For example, you earn one million pesos for a month’s work in the mines. You spend six hundred [thousand] and save four hundred to send back to your family in Colombia. That is like three salaries in one salary. Plus, you can buy so much with four hundred pesos in Colombia- the [Chilean] peso is just worth more than our currency”. (Colombian, economist intern, 20s, Santiago)*

*“I came to Arica because I had some friends who had gone to Chile to work in the mines for a better lifestyle. But I don’t really like it in Chile; food and living costs are really expensive here. I want to go back to Bolivia, but it is hard because there is no money over there... Next month I am going back to Bolivia for two weeks to see my family, and I think they will expect me to pay for a lot of things because I work and live in Chile- but my reality is different. I am not rich because I live in Chile.”*

Interviewer: “Have you thought about going across the border to Tacna in Peru?”

*“Yes, I have, but it does not really interest me. Everything is here now. I have my girlfriend here, an apartment, two cooking jobs... I think we are waiting for things to get better. Or we will move to Antofagasta where there is more money.” (Bolivian, cook and waiter, lived in Arica for 3 years)*

Research for this paper was based in Santiago, where there were noticeable amounts of Venezuelan, Haitian, and Peruvian migrants; Colombian and Bolivian migrant populations were scarcer. Table 9 shows, though still concentrated in Santiago, approximately 20% of Venezuelan and Peruvian migrants are spread throughout the rest of Chile.

Interviewer: Why did you choose to stay in Santiago?

*“I already have family members... I have 3 family members here in Santiago, which have been here for a while. My brothers and I help each other run this business.” (Peruvian, restaurant owner, 7 years in Santiago, 30s)*

Haitian migrants are likely to reside in Santiago due to institutional support offered that help with the significantly different language and cultural barriers they encounter. As of 2015, 1.6% of Haitian migrants resided outside Santiago. Interview respondent Andrea Bellet, the President of immigrant-help foundation *Viña San Bernardo* mentioned that Spanish courses, church help and informal work opportunities presented in Santiago facilitated residence in the city:

Interviewer: Why is it that Haitian immigrants are perceived to be selling ginger, lemon and limes, or ‘Super 8’ chocolate bars on the street?

*Andrea: Well for example, a business come to one Haitian household offering items to sell. And because they all live so close together, so many of them, they all get the same business ideas and opportunities. It is just a network of ideas”*

The concentration of Haitians in Santiago is problematic due to reasons of job insecurity and lifestyle instability:

*There is work, not heaps, but there is. But as well, this is not a rich country like everyone seems to think it is. It is not economical- it is expensive to live here. And now, living costs are rising. For example, when all the immigrants arrived all the prices increased. Like, apartments that cost 150,000 pesos per month are now being rented for 400,000 pesos. Haitians come, and they can't find work. You find a mountain of them [Haitians] living in one bedroom. So, they want to return to their home country. (Ecuadorian woman, 31 years living in Sanitago, secretary, 50+ years old)*

#### Humanitarian movement:

Venezuelans and Haitians primary reason for moving to Chile is not for job opportunity, but to get out of their politically or economically devastated countries. Venezuelans and Haitian respondents relayed that family connections and organizational supports were key factors that determined their region of residence. Nevertheless, Venezuelans have been able to move outside Santiago more than Haitians due to their higher qualification and Spanish levels that helped to facilitate movement outside urban support centers such as Santiago:

Interviewer: Why do you think Venezuelan immigrants tend to stay in Santiago?

*"That is not necessarily true. I have nephews who have gone to La Serena, nephews who have gone to Arica, nephews who have gone to Antofagasta... and they are all working. I stay in Santiago because the church is here. I have been with this church for four years, since I arrived." (Venezuelan, church helper, 50s)*

*"I can work in jobs, but only in jobs that are basic. And right now, Santiago central is full, and it has made it hard for me to find work."*

Interviewer: "Have you thought about moving to other cities?"

*"Yes, yes I have thought about it. I have thought about it because in other regions there is more work, well, less immigrants..."*

Interviewer: 'Is there something in Santiago that there is not in other cities?'

*"Because I have my family, my cousins that are here... maybe because of family support... and the church here is helping me in terms of food. These days have been difficult" (Venezuelan, church handyman, 5 months in Santiago, trained veteran, 30s)*

Regional geographies of ethnic stratification are also evident in New Zealand. Common perceptions are that Chinese and Indians have congregated in the North Island, particularly in New Zealand's most populous city, Auckland. This perception is not without truth: Auckland's population consists of 39% migrants, most of which are from Asia (Ho, 2015; Ministry of Business, 2016a, p. 20). Regional congregation factors into why certain nationalities take upon on certain jobs: in 2016, the top three occupations for Indians and Chinese included ICT support workers, chefs, and retail/café managers (Ministry of Business, 2016a). In the South Island, migrants will tend to take upon farm work or construction work, just like migrants living to the north of Santiago will take upon mining or agricultural jobs. Regional stratification of labour is not so much to do with the people who live there, but the resources or climate that a region offers for certain industries to prosper over others. An interviewee subject remarked upon mode of urbanization among Asian migrants:

*“Rural areas are really not top destination for qualified overseas applicants, especially in the medical field. Nurses and doctors that are trained overseas prefer to work in bigger cities, thus rural areas and hospitals are often overlooked by applicants.” (Filipino, nurse, 35, male, Auckland)*

Migrants from the United Kingdom and from South Africa are more likely to settle throughout New Zealand, including rural areas because of climate reasons:

*“For me, moving to the South Island was not really a problem. I mean, if you have been to London, you will know it can be extremely cold. So, when I got a good job offer in the South Island, I took it without hesitation (English, Policy Advisor, 30s, NZ Canterbury region)*

Climate similarities between country of origin and destination region is resonated by the following Colombian respondent:

*The climate here in Santiago is not very comfortable.. I come from Colombia where there is beautiful weather. It is tropical, but not like the extreme tropical here. In winter, it is still warm. I think that is why Colombians like to work in the north... the climate is hotter. (Factory worker, 50s, Santiago)*

New Zealand, certain working visas are attributed to certain regions that lack labour<sup>25</sup>. Such visas are a strong determinant of where New Zealand incoming migrants reside: is a large Filipino migrant community in the Otago region of New Zealand- most of whom are working as construction workers. The reasons for this mostly lie to do with the job types that the migrants enter under their Visas. As previously mentioned in this paper, New Zealand immigration drew in Christchurch construction workers after the Christchurch earthquake through the Canterbury work visa, leading to a significant number of Filipino migrants residing in the South Island (McMillan, 2016) (Ministry of Business, 2016b)

In sum, the reason of movement significantly influences in which region of a country the migrant chooses to reside. For example, migrants who have moved for reasons of greater job opportunity will move to a region where there is appropriate work, such as Bolivian miners to the north of Chile, or Filipino construction workers in Christchurch. Climate is a contributing factor to region of residence, but does not appear to be the deciding factor. Venezuelans and Haitian migrant populations who have moved to Chile to flee their own countries, they are more likely to move to where there is family and friend connections, and institutional support, which is predominantly based in urban hubs. The key difference is that New Zealand immigration policy attracts migrants to specific regions that need work. This has significantly affected what jobs migrants take upon, and the regions they end up in.

### *Recommendations*

Segregation of migrant populations can provide benefits, such as a migrant support network, However, it can also limit a migrants' exposure to jobs outside their limited social network or the respective region's dominant industries; for example, informal and low-skilled labour tends to reside in urban centers (Van Hear, 1998). Hence, in order to limit inter-regional segregation, it is recommended that the government and NGOs create migrant-support systems outside of urban hubs. Community-centers, language schools, or Visa offices in less populous regions, will encourage forcefully displaced migrants, or migrants with significant language/cultural differences to move outside of urban centers. Finally, New Zealand has

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<sup>25</sup> There is a visa specifically designed for migrant applicants to enter jobs in the South Island and Canterbury regions (Immigration New Zealand, 2018a)




successfully seen migrants move to other regions outside of Auckland through region-specific visas. This means that there are migrant populations in regions that would not otherwise normally attract migrants. Furthermore, region-specific visas ensure that the migrant has a secure, stable job and lifestyle. This is both positive for the migrant worker and the community (Instituto Católico Chileno de Migración, 2018).

### *Intra-regional stratification*

Ethnic stratification within megacities is a symptom of urbanization. Auckland and Santiago demonstrate this trend.

Figure 4, Auckland’s Chinese precincts (Friesen, 2008, p. 6) shows the congregation of Chinese peoples in Auckland City. A report by Spoonley and Carina (2009) elaborate that certain parts of Auckland now resemble small ‘China-towns’ -such as Dominion Road in Auckland City or Meadowlands in Manakau City of Auckland region. Similar trends are also found amongst Indian and Korean migrants in Auckland city, though not as profound. As previously discussed in *Discussion Point Three* Chinese immigrants to New Zealand have poorer levels of English than any other immigrant group. Such Chinese precincts will limit said Chinese migrants to learn English, as they continue to speak their native tongue among their peers. Geographies of linguistic segregation are linked intersectionally to feelings of isolation in their destination country.

*Figure 4, Auckland’s Chinese precincts (Friesen, 2008, p. 6)*



Like Auckland, there is evident ethnic-stratification in Chile’s capital. For example, Puente Alto is a *comuna* in Santiago in where Venezuelans tend to reside. A Venezuelan interview respondent contested that “*Puente Alto is more economical than living in the centre.*” Which demonstrates that cost of rent plays a factor into where newcomer migrants reside.

Pre-existing family and organisation connections in certain parts of the city are

additional factors that cause intra-regional segregation of migrants. For example, Quilicura is a suburb north of Santiago where Haitians tend to reside; they are especially attracted by the public services available to them, such as Spanish lessons and help finding work. The presence of Haitians in Quilicura is profound enough that the Quilicura municipal government now provides free education and job-seeker services; such services act as preventative measures for new immigrants engaging in delinquent career-paths, such as black-market drug trade (The Economist, 2018). In this sense, intra-regional stratification may be viewed as positive, since it allows institutions to more efficiently target populations that need help.

Table 10 (Johnston, Poulsen, & Forrest, 2007)

Causes of ethnic grouping	Consequences of ethnic grouping
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cost of rent</li> <li>2. Family and friend connections in certain neighbourhoods</li> <li>3. Organization or municipal government provisions in certain neighbourhoods</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 'Ghettos', represented by specific labour industries or even crime</li> <li>2. Segregation facilitating resentment between ethnic 'factions'</li> <li>3. Limits social networks; obtainment of jobs and multicultural skills</li> <li>4. Skewed pressure on social or health infrastructure</li> </ol>

A negative impact of ethnic (migrant) neighbourhoods is that community infrastructure is failing. This is because the new flows of migrants, specifically the Haitian population, have been unable to fill higher-skilled or formal jobs to support their own needs:

*I talked to a community in Quilicura. They said a whole lot of immigrants arrived, and at the end, the whole health system collapsed.*" - Maria Mercedes Lopez, Coordinator of Projects at United Nations International Migration Organisation (OIM), Santiago

For example, in order to create an equilibrium of workers that supports a community, there needs to be a distribution of work along a spectrum of 'low-skilled' and 'high-skilled'. At present, there is an oversupply in low skilled-jobs in several *comunas* of Santiago, such as in the hospitality, retail or street-selling industries. High population numbers are stressing the demand of fundamental high-skilled jobs (naturally), such as doctors, in which many of Chile's immigrants do not have the appropriate qualifications or skills to occupy. The continuing demand high-skilled workers is evident the following dialogue with an Ecuadorian immigrant:




Figure 5- Disequilibrium of labour in Santiago (Source: self-elaboration)

Interviewer: Do you think medical professional immigrants to Santiago can't get jobs because all the jobs are taken, or because of racism?

*Response: No-no, it's not racism. And it is not because there are no jobs in the medical field; there are vacancies. What has happened is that you need to take a test, and if you can get a good mark in the test, then you can get a job. If not, you need to study again- certain materials- and take the exam. For example, in Ecuador, we have medical schools. But they are not that great- and so half of them [students] fail the exam and have to return to their country.'*

In sum, there are two significant problems with intra-regional stratification among ethnic groups of incoming migrants. First, as evident in Santiago and Auckland, ethnic neighbourhoods limits wider social networks. By proxy, a lack of social network causes a series of negative chain events: lack of exposure to the native language, and, job or education opportunities that are offered outside the *comuna*. For example, Chinese living in ethnic neighbourhoods in Auckland are less likely to be exposed to the English language, perpetuating a feeling of 'outsider-ness'. This same ethnic neighbourhood will enter similar types of industries, as they have a limited network of entrepreneurial ideas or resources, leading to ethnic-neighbourhood sector specialisation. The second problem, as highlighted by the system failure in Quilicura (Chile), is the pressure on social and healthcare support systems, resembling a disequilibrium of low-skilled workers (street sellers, taxi drivers, domestic workers) to high-skilled workers (doctors, psychologists, family lawyers).

Organizations within Chile have made progressive efforts to integrate ethnicities and neighbourhoods, though it is recommended that the State enforce more concrete policies that will support long-term desegregation of ethnic-neighbourhoods. In Santiago, the International Migration Organization organizes weekly football matches among new immigrant children. The teams represent *comunas*, such as Estacion Central or Quilicura, and join to compete against each other in the Chile's *Estadio Nacional* (National Stadium). The games are an effective way of integrating children and parents that would otherwise be confined to their respective ethnic-*comuna*.

Further urban planning recommendations include desegregation bus systems and free bus passes for new immigrants. Desegregation bus routes were implemented by the U.S Supreme Court in 1968, during the US anti-apartheid movement. This policy implemented free buses for [black] students to go to schools in

neighbourhoods outside their own. For many children, this meant experiencing higher levels of socio-economic benefits that were previously confined to 'white' neighbourhoods. Desegregation bus systems produced overly positive results in rebalancing socio-economic segregation in communities, those of which were predominantly attributed to race (Orfield, 1983).

## *Conclusion*

Migration is global, historic movement that will continue regardless of its imaginary, real, negative or positive consequences. Following a pragmatic epistemological approach, this paper has investigated the most significant barriers for migrants of today in obtaining stable, professional jobs that are not confined to their country of origin stereotypes. Barriers were identified by interviewing recent immigrants to Chile and New Zealand. Policy recommendations were proposed based on identified barriers and existing literature. The goal to integrate immigrant populations through the stabilisation of their labour was made with the ideal of reducing perceived negative consequences of migratory flows that have contributed to the success of populist movements around the world.

In Chile and New Zealand, there are prevalent stereotypes among what types of jobs certain ethnicities enter, such as Indians as *Uber* drivers in New Zealand, or Haitians and chocolate bar sellers in Chile. The aforementioned stratification of labour among ethnic groups acts as both a cause and consequence for facilitating caused a tendency for further segregation, discrimination, and laboural exploitation of immigrants. However, after insights into immigrant populations of both New Zealand and Chile; it was not necessarily the stratification of labour that was harmful to the migrant and their society, but the stratification of *informal or low-skilled* labour among distinct ethnic groups of new migrants.

The barriers for new immigrants to obtain a formal or quality job were narrowed down to four key ideas: discrimination due to lack of integration or skin colour, and micro-discrimination based on national stereotypes; lack of knowledge of the destination country's *lingua franca* (English or Spanish) and/or lack of transferable qualifications or experience from country of origin; and geographies of segregation (intra-regional and inter-regional). The last identified barrier, 'policy' was a stand-out factor, in which almost every interview respondent referenced this barrier. This has led us to the conclusion that even though globalisation presents challenges to the nation-state sovereignty, state border controls remain critical to the composition and function of neoliberal states.

Successful integration of immigrants into states should be of governments' foremost priorities. Investment into migrant integration will act as preventative measure to system or infrastructure failure that eventually leads to resentment between ethnic groups. The example of *comuna* Quilicura's (Chile) health system collapse earlier in 2018 demonstrates that a skew to low-skilled (or over-supplied) jobs places pressure on social infrastructure, facilitating resentment between immigrants and existing residents. Successful integration will also strengthen a country's economy in the long-term. For example, immigrants that arrive to work in short-of-supply jobs support local and national institutions, just like Filipino migrants to New Zealand supported the rebuild of Christchurch after its devastating earthquakes in 2011. Diversification of labour, which would include 'up-skilling' Chile's large existing migrant population, will

help contribute to the country's long-term economic and social prosperity. This paper, therefore makes the following recommendations to the barriers identified in obtaining decentralising work among immigrant populations:

Table 11- Recommendations

<i>Barrier</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problems with transferability of qualifications or experience from country of origin to country of destination</li> <li>• Difficulties with the common spoken language in the country of destination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qualification re-validation schools, which will act as a long-term investment to the future economy of the respective country, henceforth preventing future modes of resentment or racism</li> <li>• Continued financial support for NGOs and IGOs that help migrants, such as <i>Fundación Viña San Bernando</i> or the International Organisation for Migration</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inter-regional congregation (more specifically, urbanisation)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• English or Spanish institutions placed not just in capital cities, but in less-populated cities to facilitate movement of migrants outside urban centers</li> <li>• Visa- or paper regularization- offices placed outside of urban centers, such as in growing regions such as Arica or Antofagasta in Chile.</li> <li>• Migration policy to facilitate movement to regions in demand of work. Exemplar of New Zealand's 'Canterbury Skill Shortage' visa which brought migrants to Christchurch instead of Auckland. The policy call may either derive from central government or respective regional government (Akbari &amp; MacDonald, 2014)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intra-regional segregation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Free bus passes for a fixed term. E.g., the first X months/years of an immigrant's residence)</li> <li>• Recommended mixed integration of schools to prevent intra-regional stratification between ethnicities, or trans-<i>comuna</i> bus passes for children from lower socio-economic, migrant-concentrated <i>comunas</i> to be exposed to wider social networks</li> <li>• Continuation of inter-<i>comuna</i> projects and activities run by the OIM such as inter-<i>comuna</i> football matches for children of recently immigrated families</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incoherence of immigration policy causing long queues, processes which inhibits ability to obtain formal jobs</li> <li>• Immigration policy that has not been updated to drivers of migration respective to the country of origin in question</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frequent government oversight to the 2018 Immigration Act: circumstances are continuously changing, and policies should be updated accordingly, without delay</li> <li>• An oversight agency of immigration law (such as the United Nations International Organisation for Migrants) to undertake annual analysis of whether current policies are effective and efficient for the incoming flow of migrants and their place of destination.</li> </ul>
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The support of governmental and non-governmental institutions to facilitate migrants into communicating with other ethnicities will help spread social capital networks: an important factor into obtaining a good quality job of desire. A quality, formal job is beneficial for the immigrant's livelihood, as well for their community of destination. New Zealand's immigration policy provides little gaps for approved immigrants to be without quality employment, though New Zealand could still benefit from employing strategies of integration recommended in this paper, such as free (fixed-term) bus passes for recently-arrived migrants.

Chile has the capacity to be a world exemplar for years to come if it can successfully integrate immigrants from one of the largest migratory shifts of human history into its society by securing them formal and professional jobs. Successful integration will also reduce the rise of populist movements among younger generations, who will eventually be the pioneers of the twenty-first century.

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