| Autor institucional : | Center for Global Development |
| Autor/Autores: | Gaurav Khanna , Carlos Medina , Anant Nyshadham y Jorge Tamayo |
| Fecha de publicación: | Octubre 2019 |
| Alcance geográfico: | Nacional |
| Publicado en: | Estados Unidos |
| Descargar: | Descargar PDF |
| Resumen: | Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity. |
